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In a paper delivered to the Statute Law Society in October, 19831 I explained what
the codification team was trying to do and how it was trying to do it. Since then,
our report to the Law Commission has been published2 and a substantial number
of comments on the proposals have been received. Some are favourable, some are
critical. Today I propose to respond to some of the criticisms, not of matters of
detail, but of the general principle of codification. I shall be expressing only my
personal views which are not necessarily those of my colleagues, still less of the
Law Commission.
It has been suggested that the supporters of codification believe in it for its own
sake. I do not. Throughout my career I have always taught the law of contract as
well as criminal law; but I never had any enthusiasm for the Commission's
proposal, now abandoned, to codifY the law of contract. I did not support it
because I could see no practical advantage in it. The law of contract appears to me
to be a generally consistent, coherent and logical system. It has broad general
principles which are readily applicable to a wide variety of situations and adaptable
to changing circumstances. The criminal law is entirely different. It is incoherent
and inconsistent. State almost any general principle and you find one or more
leading cases which contradict it. It is littered with distinctions which have no basis
in reason but are mere historical accidents. I am in favour of codification of the
criminal law because I see no other way of reducing a chaotic system to order, of
eliminating irrational distinctions and of making the law reasonably comprehensi-
ble, accessible and certain. These are all practical objects. Irrational distinctions
mean injustice. A is treated differently from B when there is no rational ground for
treating him differently; and that .is not justice.
The Code and law reform
The draft code is not a mere restatement of the present law. With the concurrence
of the Law Commission, we incorporated a number of proposals for reform, in
•. Professor of Law, University of Nottingham. The Child & Co London Lecture 1986, reprinted by
kind permission of Professor Smith and Child & Co.
1. [19841Statute Law Review 17.
2. Codification oflhe Criminal Law: A Report 10 the Law Commission (Law Com. No. 143), 1985.
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accordance with the principles stated in the report. Lord Justice Gibson, who was
then Chairman of the Law Commission, has since said3 that he now thinks that
this was a mistake; we should have been asked simply to state the law as it was.
Codification and law reform are different things and should not be confused. So
far as this argument relates to major proposals for law reform, like the
recommendations of the Butler Committee on Mentally Abnormal Offenders, I
acknowledge its force; but, as the Lord Justice recognises, some changes are
necessary for "effective and coherent codification." If we had merely restated the
law, the product would not have been worthy of the name of Code. The essence of
a code is that it should be a consistent and coherent whole. A mere restatement of
the present law would necessarily have lacked that essential quality.
I will take as an example the law governing impossibility in the so-called
inchoate offences, incitement, conspiracy and attempt. The amount of judicial
time devoted to this issue in the higher courts in recent years shows that it is no
mere academic problem. A incites B to commit a crime. B agrees to do so, and
does all he can to put the agreement into effect. It looks as if A is guilty of
incitement, A and B of conspiracy, and B of attempt to commit that crime. But it
turns out that, all along, it has been impossible to commit the crime. Where do we
find the law which we must now apply? For incitement it is still the discredited rule
of the common law stated in Roger Smith.4 For the attempt, the matter is regulated
by the rule in the Criminal Attempts Act 1981, as now interpreted in Anderton v
Ryan.s For conspiracy, the answer depends on whether it is a conspiracy at
common law or a statutory conspiracy contrary to s.l of the Criminal Law Act
1977 - which itself may be a question of some difficulty. If it is a common law
conspiracy, the Roger Smith rule still applies; but, if it is a statutory conspiracy, the
answer depends on s.l of the Criminal Law Act 1977, as amended by the Criminal
Attempts Act 1981 - which may be the same as the rule governing attempts or may
be a third, quite different, rule; no one can say for certain.
We have four categories, regulated by two, or, more likely, three, different rules.
No reason has ever been offered as to why different rules should prevail. I do not
find that surprising because I believe there is no reason. It is a product of the
utterly haphazard growth of the law, both common law and statute. It would not
have been beyond the wit of the codification team to restate that irrational jumble;
but who, in his right mind, would wish to do that? It is surely inconceivable that it
would ever be enacted by Parliament. An essential function of the Code is to
introduce consistency and coherence. I believe that the draft achieves it. Clause
54(1) provides:
A person may be guilty of incitement, conspiracy or attempt to commit an
offence although the commission of the offence is impossible, if it would be
3. Address to the Annual General Meeting of Justice, 3 July 1985.
4. [1975J A.C. 476.
5. [1985J A.C. 560 overruled on 25 May 1986 by Shivpllri [1986] 2 All E.R. 334 (H.L.).
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possible in the circumstances which he believes or hopes exist or will exist at
the relevant time.
We have a single rule applying to the three offences. It occupies four lines. It
would replace a mass of confused and confusing case law. I believe that it provides
an answer to all the well-known problems of persons inciting, conspiring and
attempting to steal from safes or pockets which are in fact empty, to handle goods
which they wrongly believe to be stolen, to import parcels which they wrongly
believe to contain controlled drugs, to kill people who are already dead,
dishonestly to obtain property by statements which they wrongly believe to be false;
and so on. The drafting may still be capable of improvement; but I have seen no
criticism yet which leads me to doubt whether it will achieve its aim.
Please do not think that this is an isolated example. There are plenty more.
Suppose that I have killed your dog and am charged with criminal damage. My
defence is that it was attacking me. If I say I was defending my trousers, the
Criminal Damage Act 1971 will apply to determine whether my action was
justified. But if I say I was defending my leg, the common law is still applicable.
And they are different. I will have a better chance of acquittal if I say I was
defending my trousers. Trousers, in the criminal law, are more important than
legs. Or suppose that, seeing X being attacked by Y, I go to X's assistance and
injure or kill Y. If I am charged with an offence against Y and I say I was acting in
defence of X, the common law of private defence, with its mass of case-law,
determines whether my conduct was justified; but if I say I was acting to prevent a
crime being committed by Y, then the matter is governed by section 3 of the
Criminal Law Act 1967 which replaced the common law on that subject. As it is
very likely that I was acting both in private defence and in the prevention of crime,
this is something of a dilemma.
Codification and policy
The achievement of consistency where it does not exist in the present law
necessarily involves some degree of law reform. One of two or more competing
rules must be selected or some new rule devised. To deal with impossibility, we
selected that rule which we knew that Parliament, after full and well-informed
debate, decided should apply to attempts. Parliament's intention was frustrated,
partly because of poor draftsmanship, by the decision in Anderton v Ryan. I believe
that our clause could not be misunderstood as section 1 of the Criminal Attempts
Act was; and I would point out that this was not with the benefit of hindsight. Our
report was published before the decision in Anderton v Ryan; but we were
conscious of the ambiguity in section 1, anticipated the risk of misinterpretation
and, I believe, removed it.
The choice between competing rules depends on considerations of policy; and
we recognise throughout our report that the personal views of three or four
academic lawyers on policy are very far from being of overwhelming weight.
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Where policy is embedded in a well-settled rule of law we have generally
attempted to restate that rule without regard to whether we might think it right or
wrong. But where some public body, principally the Law Commission or the
Criminal Law Revision Committee, has found the existing law to be defective and
has made recommendations for change, we have attempted to follow as faithfully
as possible their proposals. The point that I wish to emphasise today is that if we,
or one of these committees, are judged, for any reason, to have made a wrong
decision of policy, that in no way impairs the case for codification. Consistency and
coherence must then be achieved by substituting the preferred rule for that which
we have adopted. In the case of impossibility, any alternative to that which we have
proposed would be more complex; it would not go into four lines; and it would be
likely to pose more problems of interpretation - all of which seem to me to be good
reasons for sticking to the rule proposed; but, if another rule were preferred, it
would still be a great advantage to have the single rule in place of the current
confusion.
Similarly, I stress - for there is some misunderstanding about this - that the
rights and wrongs of the continuing controversy between those whom I may loosely
call the subjectivists and the objectivists about the concept of recklessness in the
criminal law have nothing to do with the case for codification. Certainly,
codification must resolve the controversy; but the merits of codification are the same
whether the controversy is resolved in favour of the subjectivists or of the
objectivists. Either way, we can achieve consistency and coherence and avoid
making irrational distinctions. This is not to say that I think it is not important to
make the right choice and I have my own views about that. But, if my views are
wrong, then I am in favour of codifYing the other, right, view.
In Caldwe1l6 the House of Lords said that the concept of recklessness which has
long been held to be implicit in the word "malicious" when used in a statute,
involves "fine and impracticable distinctions", and a distinction that "would not be
a practicable distinction for use in a jury trial.,,7 But crimes involving malice are
unaffected by that decision. If the House was right, is it not a public scandal that
we are continuing to use (as we have for more than a century) an "impracticable
distinction" in serious cases of causing injury to the person, that juries and
magistrates are sending people to prison, or letting them go free, on the basis of a
distinction which it is not practicable to make? If that is right, the sooner the
Caldwell test becomes generally applicable the better.
As the law stands, if a man takes an airgun and, not even considering the
possibility that it might be loaded (as is the fact), aims and fires it at X, breaking
X's spectacles and destroying his eye, the man will be liable for causing criminal
damage to the spectacles but will not be criminally liable at all for the destruction
of the eye.s The law gives greater protection to spectacles than to eyes. But,
6. [1982] A.C. 341.
7. [1982] A.C. at p.352.
8. Wv. Do/bey [1983] Grim. L.R. 681 (D.c.).
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although the man has committed no crime by destroying the eye, if X dies of the
injury within a year and a day, he will be guilty of manslaughter.9 No-one ever
decided, as a matter of policy, that we should make these strange distinctions - and
it is difficult to see how any rational person could decide to make them. It is a
historical accident, arising from the haphazard, piecemeal development of the law.
What I am pleading for today is not any particular rule but for consistency and
coherence, where distinctions, if we make them, are based on reason and not on
accident. This can be achieved only by taking an overall view of the whole system,
not by tinkering with bits of the law; and that means codification.
Accessibility and comprehensibility
We claim in our report that codification will make the law more accessible and
comprehensible. Some of our critics are very sceptical of that claim. Several of
them have been kind enough to say that the principles are now readily accessible
and stated in a comprehensible manner in the text book, Smith & Hogan on
Criminal Law. I would be the last to decry the virtues of that book. But they are far
from being the virtues of a code. We try hard to state the law as simply and clearly
as possible. But, if the law itself is inconsistent, incoherent and uncertain, the
statement of it is inevitably complex and accessible only to the intelligent and
determined student. If the Code brings consistency and coherence, it necessarily
makes the law more accessible and comprehensible. Were the Code to be enacted
tomorrow, the four lines of clause 54(1) would be the sole source of the law on the
vexed topic of impossibility. The exposition of it would be infinitely shorter and
simpler than is possible today. Or consider the concept of recklessness with its
present variety of meanings. My experience of teaching, not only undergraduates,
but also members of the profession and, indeed, judges, convinces me that many of
them have the greatest difficulty, in grasping these subtleties themselves, and in
the case of judges, explaining them to juries. It is not necessary. The concept is
capable of definition in short and clear terms. We are criticised for what is seen as
our belief that the law can be made simple. I have stated in all five editions of my
Law of Theft that that part of the Criminal Law cannot be made, as I put it,
"childishly simple". I have not changed my mind .about that. In the law of theft,
notwithstanding frequent judicial wishful thinking, there is no escape from the
complexities of the civil law governing proprietary interests. Of course, there are
limits to simplification. But the point is that the present law is very much more
complex than it needs to be and it should be made as simple as possible.
Certainty
Similar scepticism has been expressed about our claim that the Code can make the
law more certain. It is objected that the Code would throw up all sorts of new
problems of construction, would generate a great mass of new case-law and, in the
9. Cf. Seymour [1983] A.C. 493 (H.L.); Kong Cheuk Kwan v. The Quem [1985] Crim. L.R. 653, 655.
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words of an eminent critic, "the medicine willwithin a short period of time prove
to be worse than the disease." Clearly this must be taken very seriously, because
there is no doubt that it could happen. Section 16(1)(a) of the Theft Act 1968,
obtaining a pecuniary advantage by deception, the provision which Lord
Edmund-Davies dubbed "a judicial nightmare",10 is a horrible warning of the
effects of poor draftsmanship. But that was a provision which was making
completely new law, it was prepared in haste while the Theft Bill was going
through Parliament, and it did not have the advantage of being considered by the
Criminal Law Revision Committee or any similar committee. Another, equally
horrific, provision is section 6 of the same Act which is concerned with the
meaning of the words "with the intention of permanently depriving the other of
[his property]". This section was actually introduced in the name of codification.
The CLRC had been content to leave the phrase undefined, to be interpreted in
the light of the pre-Theft Act case law. The Home Office, with uncharacteristic
enthusiasm, introduced the clause which became section 6 "to make the Bill as
complete a statement of the law as practicable, bearing in mind the decision,
reached since the CLRC reported, to have a comprehensive Criminal Code.,,11 In
the recent case of Lloyd, 12the Court of Appeal was inclined to agree with Mr. J. R.
Spencer's description of section 6 as a section which "sprouts obscurities at every
phrase.,,13 The court held that section 6 should be interpreted in such a way as to
ensure that nothing is construed as an intention permanently to deprive which
would not, prior to the 1968 Act, have been so construed.14 Of course,
"codification" which has to be construed in that way is not merely useless, it is a
great nuisance. If I thought codification had to be, or might be, like that, I would
be as firmly opposed to it as anyone. But I am quite convinced it does not have to
be like that.
Of course a code will generate case-law. How can it fail to do so when virtually
every direction to a jury which results in a conviction is scanned for some defect
which might result in the conviction being quashed, including the possible
misconstruction by the judge of the relevant legislation?How much case-law it will
generate and how damaging its effect will be depends on how well the Code has
been drafted and on how well it is interpreted by the courts.
Draftsmanship
A friendly critic, wntmg to the Law Commission about the difficulties of
draftsmanship, doubts whether I would claim that the codification team could
succeed where others have failed. This is no occasion for false modesty; but it is
10. In Royle [1971] 3 All E.R. 1359, 1363.
11. Cited by Mr. J. R. Spencer, "The Metamorphosis of Section 6 of the Theft Act," [1977] Grim.
L.R. 653, 655.
12. [1985] QB. 829.
13. [1985] Grim. L.R. 653.
14. [1985] 2 All E.R. at p.666.
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for others, not me, to judge how well the drafting has been done. Morever, it is
now being subjected to intense scrutiny by many acute minds. If, at the end of this
process, we cannot achieve more in terms of clarity than has been attained in
criminal statutes in recent years, then we should abandon the enterprise. As I have
said elsewhere, I undertook this task with the utmost scepticism whether a group
of academic lawyers, with no proven skills in draftsmanship, could do what was
required. The comments I have received from some of those with great experience
in construing statutes encourages me to believe that I was unduly pessimistic. If so
it is not because we are cleverer than (or indeed as clever as) the Parliamentary
draftsmen, for whose talents I have the highest respect, but because we are a group
who have devoted much of our professional lives to a close study of this particular
branch of the law, because we were able to concentrate on the subject for a much
longer period than, I suspect, is ever permitted to the Parliamentary counsel and
because we worked as a team, each member of which subjected the work of the
others to intense, and sometimes humiliating, scrutiny. We may have been
inexperienced at drafting, but we were highly experienced at criticising the
drafting of others. Above all, we were able and required, to take an overall view
and thus avoid inconsistency.
Rules of interpretation
Our terms of reference required us to consider and make proposals in relation to
the rules which should govern the interpretation of the Code. I began by thinking
that it was not practicable to formulate rules of construction but I changed my
mind and I now think this a vital part of the Code, if we are to avoid the problems
which our critics feared. As the Codification Report states, "A prime object of
codification is the provision of a clear and authoritative statement of the criminal
law.,,15Even if it succeeds at the outset, it will cease to be that if a meaning is put
upon its words which they cannot reasonably bear. The words of the Code then
become misleading and a trap. Recent case law shows that there is a danger of this
happening in the name of "purposive construction".16 If the meaning is plain, I
submit that it should be the duty of the court to give effect to that plain meaning,
whether it likes it or not. Clause 3(1) is designed to ensure that, as far as possible,
(because, inevitably, the courts themselves have the last word) this is done.
But there are bound to be ambiguities. We are criticised for not incorporating
the rule that penal statutes must be strictly construed and all ambiguities resolved
in favour of the defendant. In my opinion there are powerful reasons for not
codifying that rule. We do find it applied from time to time, but, if it had been
universally applied, nearly all of the decided cases of statutory construction which
have gone in favour of the Crown would have been decided the other way. Strict
liability and vicarious liabilitywould be virtually non-existent. As with other rules
15. Para. 3.3.
16. See particularly Ayres [1984] A.C. 447, criticised, [1984] Grim. L.R. 354.
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of construction, the courts apply it when they want to apply it; and, when they do
not, they forget about it. But if it were stated in the Code as a rule of universal
application it could not be ignored in this way. A much better way forward, in my
opinion, is some further search for the true legislative intent. This is often very
easily ascertainable, particularly where the legislation is based on a report
accompanied by a draft bill as Law Commission reports generally are. If the
Report presented to Parliament makes entirely clear what the provision is intended
to do, and if the Act faithfully reproduces the terms of the Bill, what justification
can there be for resolving an ambiguity by givingit a different meaning? Parliament
must surely be presumed to have read and understood the Report presented to it
and to have intended the provision to do what the report says it does. Sometimes
the court does find its way to the Report, but frequendy it does not; and then we
have the unhappy spectacle of the court declaring that the statute means "X"
because, they say, that iswhat Parliament must have intended; when the fact is that
Parliament intended not "X" but "Y". Can it really be right that the law should be
founded on a demonstrable fallacy? In Donnel/y17 the Court of Appeal held that
under the Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981 it is no longer necessary to prove
that an alleged forgery "tells a lie about itself" as was required at common law and
by the Forgery Act 1913. "There can be no doubt," said the court, "that
Parliament intended to make new law." So it did; but not in this respect. More
recendy in Anderson'S Lord Bridge, construing section 1(1) of the Criminal Law
Act 1977, said "I do not find it altogether easy to understand why the draftsman of
this provision chose to use the phrase 'in accordance with their intentions'." He
went on to hold that it means, in effect, "in accordance with the terms of the
agreement". But the answer to Lord Bridge's problem was readily ascertainable
from the Law Commission Report on Conspiracy and Criminal Law Reform.19
The draftsman used the phrase in question because that is precisely what he
meant. In both these cases the intention of Parliament was defeated. What is the
point of our having expensive Law Commission reports presented to, debated and
accepted by Parliament if their intention is to be frustrated by the real or affected
ignorance of the courts of what the legislation is intended to achieve? These
illustrations by no means stand alone. The Code aims to prevent such
misconstruction of its terms, first by the provision of illustrations which it is hoped
will show the court clearlywhat is intended; and second, where the meaning is still
ambiguous, by authorising resort to the Law Commission's final report which, it is
assumed, will precede the enactment of the Code.
I am persuaded that those provisions, as they now stand, will require some
modification; but I am not persuaded that they are unnecessary or undesirable.
17. (1984) 79 Cr. App. R. 76.
18. [1985] 2 All E.R. 961.
19. Law Com. No. 76, 1976, 1.38 and 7.2, recommendation (5).
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The Code and the common law
The most common and powerful objection to codification is that it would stultify
the development of the law, that - as a distinguished critic puts it - it "must
inevitably lead to ossification of the law and perpetuation of error."
I accept that there is some force in this argument. In some areas but, I think,
very few, codification might preclude development of the law by the courts in ways
which would be desirable. Let me give an example. In codifYing the common law
relating to double jeopardy we had to consider the effect of a conviction in a
foreign court. The authority on this is not extensive but it goes back a long way and
it is consistent: a conviction in a foreign court is a bar to trial for the same offence
in an English court. Clause 15(5) of the draft Code restates that rule. But we had
no sooner submitted our report to the Law Commission than the Court of Appeal
decided in Thomas2o that, although a foreign conviction is usually a bar, this is not
so where the accused has been convicted abroad in his absence, has taken no part
in the proceedings, is not extraditable and it is very unlikely that the foreign
judgment against him could ever be enforced. This perfectly proper development
of the common law would, to say the least, have been difficult for the court to make
if the draft Code had been in force. The Law Commission will, no doubt, take
account of Thomas in any revision they may make of the draft Code; but no
legislator however percipient can think of all possible contingencies and, however
excellent the ultimate form of the Code, there would certainly arise other
unforeseen points where a court might be obliged to say that it must follow the
Code with reluctance because it had taken away its power to develop the law. This
objection might be of overwhelming weight if there still existed a great body of the
common law of crime which was being developed by the courts for the public
good. The critics of codification speak as if there were. The Law Commission
themselves in their Introduction to the Code quote Sir Leon Radzinowicz:
"The common law of this country, like the forces of growth which determine
it, is sui generis; it constitutes an integral part of the national heritage, and
discharges a political, social and moral function which is much more precious
than the shapely codes which the seekers after a legal paradise aspired to
create."
It sounds splendid; but where is this great developing body of law? I look for it in
vain. Of the seven thousand or more offences only a handful are not already
defined by statute. Murder, manslaughter, affray, assault, perversion of the course
of justice, public nuisance and a miscellany of obscure and rarely used
misdemeanours are the only survivors. Of course, murder and manslaughter are
very important; but is there anything in their development over the last thirty years
in which we can take any pride?
20. [1985] QB. 604.
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The Homicide Act 1957 alludes to the mental element of murder as "malice
aforethought" (express or implied) - terminologywhich goes back to the thirteenth
century and which does not make sense in modem English. Kenny in 1902
described it as a "mere arbitrary symbol". It is the mental element in murder
which distinguishes it from manslaughter and, indeed, from accidental death. It is
of crucial importance. Surely, after seven hundred years of common law, there
should be no doubt about what it is. Yet today, notwithstanding five decisions of
the House of Lords since the Homicide Act, it is impossible to state it with any
degree of conviction. Smith21 laid down a largely objective test of liability and that
led to the passing of Section 8 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967. It then took two
decisions of the House, Hyam22 and Cunningham23 to settle (or sowe thought) that
it was necessary and sufficient to prove that the defendant knew that it was highly
probable that his act would cause death or serious bodily harm, though still leaving
in doubt the question whether the act in question must be "aimed at" another.
Moloney24 decided both that the act need not be aimed at another and that it was
not, after all, sufficient that the defendant knew that death or serious bodily harm
was highly probable; he must intend one of those consequences; but what is
"intention"? The House laid down guidelines for the instruction of juries; but
these when used by the trial judge inHancock and Shankland were promptly held by
the Court of Appeal to be defective,25so that the convictions were quashed. The
Court of Appeal devised some new guidelines. The House of Lords upholding the
decision of the Court of Appeal, has agreed26 that the Moloney guidelines are
indeed defective and said that it is better not to have any general guidelines at all
but does not tell us whether the principles oflaw enshrined in those formulated by
the Court of Appeal are right or wrong. The problem is unsolved and will not go
away.The meaning of the word intention is not self evident as is apparent from the
widely differing interpretations which have been put upon it by the judges in the
last thirty years. Counsel willmake submissions about it. If the judge does not offer
guidance in his direction, intelligent jurymen will ask questions about it. The judge
will have to give a ruling; and I do not envy him his task.
The common law develops slowly; but 700 years to determine the mental
element required for our gravest crime is too long. The matter can and should be
settled. I venture to claim that if the Code definition of murder and of intention
had been in force in 1959, the whole saga from Smith to Hancock and Shankland
would have been impossible; and I would submit that that would have been a great
gain for the law.
I will not go into the recent history of manslaughter but the story is little if any
21. [1961] A.C. 290.
22. [1975] A.C. 255.
23. [1982] A.C. 566.
24. [1985] A.C. 905.
25. Discussed [1986] Grim..L.R. 181.
26. 27th February 1986.
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better than that of murder. The limits of manslaughter by recklessness, by gross
negligence and constructive manslaughter are obscure and confused.27 The
common law offence of affray has been the subject of judicial development. It was
resurrected in Sharp28 in 1957 after a long period of desuetude and, as defined in
that case, has been steadily expanded in scope - it is no longer a joint offence
requiring proof of unlawful fighting by two or more; it no longer need be proved to
have taken place in public; if it occurs in a public place it no longer need be proved
that anyone other than the victim was present or likely to be present; the victim
himself may now be the "bystander" referred to in earlier decisions.29 There has
been judicial development but surely objectionable judicial development. The
judges long ago recognised that it was not for them to create new crimes; but the
expansion of old ones is no less objectionable. The recent history of perverting the
course of justice is not dissimilar. The common law concept of the disorderly
house is so vague that a house may be "disorderly" for reasons ranging from the
playing of lawful games for stakes which a jury considers to be excessive to the
provision of obscene shows, so the court had little difficulty recently30 in holding
that provision of certain types of service by a single prostitute could render the
house a disorderly one, so by-passing the other rule of the common law that it
takes two prostitutes to make a brothel. When the reform of the law of prostitution
was being discussed, I observed with interest that some of my judicial friends were
very attached to the concept of the disorderly house because it enabled them to put
down behaviour which they found - as perhaps we nearly all would - thoroughly
reprehensible; but with great respect to them, that is the function of Parliament,
not the judges. As for public nuisance, that is such a woolly concept that its
potential is scarcely less than that of public mischief which the courts themselves
renounced, not only as a crime which may be committed by an individual, but as an
object of common law conspiracy.
I have been speaking so far of common law crimes. What about general
principles? They are much eroded by statute and survive in pockets with no logical
justification. I hope this is adequately demonstrated by the examples which I have
given from the law of impossibility and self-defence and the prevention of crime.
There is no going back to the pure common law. The only sensible way forward is
to consolidate the statutory and common law rules into a consistent principle - i.e.
by codifYing. Apart from these surviving pockets there are general principles for
the construction of criminal statutes like the presumption in favour of mens rea; but
these have been applied so haphazardly over the years as to be of very little value.
Even the "golden thread" of the presumption of innocence established by the
House of Lords in Woolmington has become somewhat tarnished. Codification
27. See commentary on Kong Gheuk Kwan v. The Queen [1985] Grim. L.R. at p.788 and authorities
cited therein.
28. [1957] 1 QB. 552.
29. Attorney-General's Reference (No.3 of 1983) [1985] Grim. L.R. 207.
30. Tan [1983] QB. 1053.
147
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL
affords the opportunity to formulate these principles in more precise terms and so
to achieve greater predictability in the construction of statutes.
There is, however, one substantial area of common law, namely that governing
secondary liability - the law of aiding, abetting, counselling and procuring the
commission of offences. Yet in the leading case of the Attorney-General's Reference
(No. 1 of 197sl1 the Court of Appeal treated the law as if it were already codified
(though very imperfectly) by section 8 of the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861
and held that the right approach was to give the four words, "aid, abet, counsel and
procure", their ordinary meaning, bearing in mind that each probably has a
different meaning "because if there were no such difference, then Parliament
would be wasting time in using four words where two or three would do." I happen
to believe that this was quite a wrong approach and that it is no more appropriate to
seek to give a natural meaning to "aid, abet, counselor procure" than it would be
to try to give such a meaning to "malice aforethought (express or implied)". The
court, with scant regard for legal history, proceeded as if these words were used by
Parliament for the first time in 1861, ignoring the fact that they had been in use
from at least the sixteenth century and had acquired a technical meaning long
before 1861, with implications about presence at, or absence from, the scene of the
crime and other matters which no-one could possibly discern from the ordinary
meaning of the words. When the court had some common law, it failed to
recognise it.
With all respect to Sir Leon Radzinowicz and those who take similar views, his
rhetoric is without foundation in fact. If we look at the surviving common law of
crime we find that it exists only in patches which are the result of historical
accidents, that it is frequently uncertain and obscure, if not pernicious and that
there is scarcely anything which is worth preserving in its present form.
Objections to judge-made criminal law
There are, moreover, serious objections to changing the common law of crime by
judicial decision, since the change is retrospective. In Hyam32 Lord Hailsham
expressed himself relieved at being able to reject the argument of the appellant and
to hold that Vickers33 had rightly decided in 1957 that an intention to cause
grievous bodily harm was still a sufficient mens rea for murder after the Homicide
Act 1957 because, he said, if the House had decided to overthrow Vickers "a very
high proportion of those now in prison for convictions of murder must necessarily
have their convictions set aside and verdicts of manslaughter substituted." But in
Moloney34 neither Lord Hailsham, nor any other of their Lordships, seems to have
had any inhibitions about the similar effect of their decision on Hyam itself. If
Moloney is right, it seems necessarily to follow that Mrs. Hyam was herself
convicted on a misdirection and that her conviction could have been upheld only
31. [1975] QB. 773, at p. 779.
32. [1975] A.C. 55, 68.
33. [1957] 2 QB. 664.
34. [1985] A.C. 90S, 926.
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by the application of the proviso. Lord Bridge indeed commented that he found it
difficult to understand why the prosecution in Hyam did not seek to support the
conviction, as an alternative to their main submission, on the ground that there had
been no actual miscarriage of justice. The implication seems to be that that would
have been the right way to decide the case. But I have some difficulty with Lord
Bridge's opinion that no reasonable jury could have failed to convict Mrs. Hyam if
they had been told that it must be proved that she intended to cause grievous
bodily harm.
How many people are today serving life sentences of imprisonment because,
between 1974 and 1985, they were convicted on a Hyam direction which, because
of a re-interpretation of the common law is, and always was, wrong? How many
have similarly been wrongly convicted of offences under s.18 of the Offences
against the Person Act 1861? That is where the change makes the law more
lenient. Where it makes it more severe, the effect is that some have been acquitted
when, if the law, as we now know it to be, had been properly applied, they might
have been convicted. More seriously, the conviction of the first unlucky victims of
the expansion of the criminal law infringes the principle of legality - that no one
should be convicted for doing an act not previously declared to be an offence.
In one respect the draft Code would preserve judicial creativity. Clause 49
provides that a person does not commit an offence by doing an act which is
justified or excused by any rule of the common law, except insofar as the rule is
inconsistent with the Code or any other enactment. Nothing in the Code is to limit
any power of the courts to determine the existence, extent or application of any
such rule of the common law.
The definition of offences in the present law frequently includes the words
"without lawful excuse" or "unlawfully". There is no consistency in this usage but,
whether these or similar words are used or not, it is clear that recognised general
defences - such as duress - apply though no mention is made of them. There is no
precisely defined limit to such general defences and, in my opinion, it is not
possible to offer a definitive statement of all the principles- and rules which may
justify or excuse conduct which would otherwise be criminal. Many of these are
part of the general law, civil as well as criminal. An example is the law which allows
the chastisement of children. If the Code were to provide closed definitions of
these rules we might have a situation in which the criminal law forbade conduct
which the civil law allowed - which would be absurd - or the civil court might find
itself constrained by the terms of the Code in order to avoid a conflict. In including
clause 49 we have followed the advice of such eminent authorities as Mr. Justice
Stephen and Professor Glanville Williams and the precedents in the Codes of
Canada, New Zealand and elsewhere which are based on Stephen's draft. For the
reasons I have given, I think such a provision is not only advisable, but essential.
An example of its utility is provided, in my opinion, by Mrs. Gillick's case.35
35. Gil/ick v. WestNorfolk and WisbechArea Health Authority [1986] A.C. 112 (H.L.), discussed [1986]
Grim. L.R. 113.
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Consider a doctor who provides contraceptive advice for a girl under sixteen,
knowing as he may well do, that his advice will facilitate or encourage sexual
intercourse between her and a man. The man commits an offence. The House of
Lords has told us that the doctor's advice is lawful if the girl has capacity to
consent and understands the advice and he believes it to be necessary for the
physical, mental and emotional health of the child. If the advice is lawful, the
doctor cannot be committing a crime. Yet all the usual conditions for liabilityas an
aider and abettor seem to be satisfied. Generally, it is enough that the defendant
knows that his act will assist or encourage the commission of the offence; and it is
no answer that he has an unimpeachable motive, or that the offence would be
committed anywayor that the encouragement is given through an innocent agent.
The House, in my opinion, has propounded a new justification for conduct which
would otherwise be criminal. I point this out, not to criticise the result; rather the
contrary. It is essential that the courts should be able to consider the social, ethical
and public policy issues involved and to reach the conclusion which, in their
opinion, these considerations dictated.
I have not, in this lecture, even mentioned the difficulties involved in the
enactment of a criminal code. I know these to be enormous. What I have tried to
do is to persuade you that it would be worth making considerable effects to
overcome them.
150
